7.1. In 800/900 MHz, additional requirements upto 6.2+6.2 MHz may be met by coordinating on a case by case basis in the frequency bands 902.5-915 MHz/947.5-960 MHz. These may not be contiguous and may be in smaller chunks of 0.6 Mhz as accepted by industry. Efforts would be made to make available in larger chunks to the extent feasible. Further, these may not be same in all the areas.

7.2. In 1700-2000 MHz, following requirements may be met in the frequency band 1710-1785 MHz/1805-1880 MHz :-

(a) 10+10 MHz for whole of India may be coordinated on case by case basis.

(b) Additional 10+10 MHz as reserve for metro cities (Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, Calcutta) may be coordinated on case by case basis. This reserve of 10+10 MHz may also be coordinated on case by case basis, in places other than metro cities as the need arises with the proviso that in certain areas it may be less than 10+10 MHz. To achieve this reserve within mutually accepted time frame, existing user’s technology would need upgradation with adequate compensation. IAF, the major user of the band would need a compensation of Rs 140 Cr to digitise its existing analog systems in Gujrat and Maharashtra sector. The estimate for the Central, Eastern and North Eastern sector is 205 crores.

(c) The allocation at (b) above may not be contiguous and may be in smaller chunks of 1.25 MHz as accepted by industry taking into account technological necessities of the system as well as availability of spectrum for coordination, while efforts would be made to make available in larger chunks to the extent feasible. Further, these may not be same in all the areas. In this context, it is noted that whole of 20+20 MHz may not be required in one go and the requirements would be in phases as the networks expand depending on market needs and subscriber base, keeping the medium term (5 years) in view.

(d) All technological solutions should be applied by the service operators to provide maximum capacity from the assigned spectrum. In other words, solution should be found by adopting technical measures for using spectrum optimally and not by demanding excessive spectrum.

(e) There will be no scope for further exploitation of the 1700 – 2000 MHz band for public telecommunication services including other types of technologies, unless appropriate spectrum in the frequency band 2000-2300 MHz is coordinated progressively for meeting the requirements of the services for which the frequency band 1700-2000 MHz is being presently exploited.

(f) Spectrum made available by the recommendations (a) and (b) should be used for new private operators, MTNL/DoT and existing operators, as the case may be. Amount of spectrum to be pegged for an operator and number of players are interdependent. Further, subscriber base of an operator is also dependent on number of players and hence, the spectrum requirement per operator could diminish if there are more number of players.                                                                             (Para 3.13)

7.3. Public telecom operators demand more spectrum in order to reduce the network capital expenditure. Network planning by operators in India is not considered to be optimal, since for a small subscriber base a larger bandwidth of precious spectrum is being demanded/occupied. The capital expenditure depends on the cell size and the trend world over is to go for smaller cell size in order to provide service to a larger subscriber base within the available bandwidth which increases the capital expenditure. The attempt to avoid increased capital expenditure by the operators inevitably calls for more bandwidth. Therefore, the operators seek more bandwidth, which is priced low compared to the other fees and expenditure, to reduce the capital expenditure. In the opinion of the Committee, this is not an optimum solution for the nation. Also, larger cell size corresponds to taller antenna, resulting in more interference problems. From all these considerations, operators should increase their capital expenditure by decreasing cell size and lowering antenna height. This is the optimum solution evolved internationally and should be insisted upon in the National Telecom Policy. (Para 3.13 (e))

7.4. Coexistence, Accomodation and Coordination. Taking into account the life span of telecommunication equipment, the availability of new technologies, national policies and priorities including financial implications, the approach of spectrum sharing, coordination, coexistence and accommodation where feasible, on a case by case basis is the most acceptable and cost effective option to overcome the growing demands in a band. (Paras 1.10 & 5.3)

7.5. NFAP – 81 should be revised service wise and made public without including security information. (Para 3.8)

7.6. While allocating the spectrum, due weightage and preference should be given to ‘Spectrum efficient’ technologies. Spectrum availability will be ascertained from the WPC before induction/introduction of any technology. (Para 3.9 (h))

7.7. Spectrum and associated satellite orbits have economic value. Every user should pay for spectrum on non-discriminatory basis except defence forces. (Para 5.8)

7.8. In the context of past experience and the economic, social and security environment prevalent in India, the most widely practical spectrum pricing structure based on ‘Differential Value Formulae’ is considered to be the best alternative wherein, an economic utility value is attributed to spectrum based on the value derived from its use. Spectrum pricing should be determined taking into account, inter-alia, the following factors :-

(a) Technical factors involved in utilisation of spectrum.

(b) Commercial potentiality.

(c) Premium bands (spectrum location, application and geographical area dependent).

(d) Safety, security and similar usage.

(e) Location of spectrum. (e.g. VHF, UHF)

(f) Service (e.g. FS, FSS, BSS).

(g) Application (e.g. CMTS, Basic) (Para 5.9)

7.9. Spectrum pricing should be so developed that it appropriately compares with cost of equipment and other available means of communications so that there is no imbalance and there is no undue demand on the spectrum. It is felt that a Group be formed on a regular basis, for evolving appropriate spectrum pricing policy and its review from time to time. (Para 5.10)

7.10. Compensation for Relocation. Relocation and orderly transition arrangement should be established on case by case basis as a continuous process, and compensation for relocation should be considered, as appropriate, in Government as well as in private sector, by using one or more of the following methodologies :-

(a) Compensation is provided by the new entrant.

(b) Compensation is provided from the funds kept aside, out of spectrum charges levied.

(c) Compensation be provided in form of Government decision to relocate networks and transform developmental activities accordingly, by making available suitable funds. (Para-5.11)

7.11. There was considerable enthusiasm for auctioning the spectrum as a mechanism for directly ascertaining and collecting the market price value of the spectrum. But a more cautious wait - and - see policy now prevails, with most countries waiting for the more adventurous few to find the pitfalls and develop workable solutions. For developing countries like India, it is prudent to adopt such a wait-and-see policy for the next five years. (Para 5.7 (d))

7.12. WPC Wing is spectrum management and radio regulatory agency which needs to be impartial, non-user and non-service provider type of body without any direct or indirect linkage with any user organisation. Further, it is the national nodal agency for all matters relating to ITU and APT and responsible for discharging all international treaty obligations on behalf of Government of India in the capacity of Indian Administration. The Committee’s considered view, therefore, is that the level of officers of WPC Wing, a coordinating body for such an important natural resource is much below the level than that of international practices and therefore the status of the officers is needed to be brought to commensurate level. It is to be reiterated that officers of WPC Wing are authenticated officers under the Ministry of Home Affairs. WPC Wing must be an independent Wing of the Ministry of Communications or alternatively under the Cabinet Secretariat in the charge of Wireless Adviser to the Government of India, who shall be at the level of Special Secretary with full powers of secretary delegated to him in view of the special nature of the national and international coordination. Wireless Adviser shall directly report to the Minister. He shall be delegated the following :-

(a) Full powers of Secretary to the Government of India.

(b) Powers to create posts as applicable to the Ministries.

(c) Independent main budget head under the Ministry controlled by Wireless Adviser incorporating secretarial budget, budget of the field organisation (WMO) and budget for the international cooperation.

(d) Powers to set up operational monitoring labs in pursuance of duries assigned to him.

(e) Powers to sanction upto five crores expenditure.

(f) Wireless Adviser shall also be the Chairman of the EFC and SFC pertaining to the budget expenditure of the WPC Wing.

(g) Powers for appointing Head of the office.

(h) Powers to write off as delegated to Secretary to the Government of India. (Paras 4.9 and 4.11)

7.13. WPC Wing should have :-

(a) Independent Financial Adviser.

(b) Separate budget different from that of DoT with main budget head under the Ministry controlled by Wireless Adviser.

(c) Independent administration, accounts and finance as applicable to the Ministry. (Para-4.11)

7.14. WPC should be appropriately strengthened, including automation of spectrum management activities and radio monitoring facilities. Appropriate funding resources should be made available (Paras 4.11 and 4.12)

7.15. A study should be undertaken by private consultant on the structure, strengthening and other aspects of WPC. (Para 4.12)

7.16. Role of SACFA should continue to be that of an advisory body. Further, there should be enhanced involvement and constructive participation of the private sector in the activities of SACFA, ITU and APT with a view to providing greater transparency. However, decision should continue to rest with the Government. SACFA should work through sub-committees like :-

(a) Siting sub-committee.

(b) NFAP sub-committee.

(c) International activities sub-committee.

(d) Spectrum pricing sub-committee.

(e) Relocation and compensation sub-committee.

(f) Sub-committee on technology/equipment standardisation in relation to Spectrum Management issues. (Para 4.13)

7.17. Spectrum Management System should be made more efficient, transparent and responsive by computerisation and modernisation. (Para 4.12)

7.18. Security provisions should be taken note of and appropriately included while issuing licences or tenders. (Para 6.1)

7.19. A few countries including India have not adopted the NATO band for their defence requirements. Due to economy of scales, the equipment of NATO / Western countries is most competitive in the world market. Such telecommunication equipment bought in India, from these countries prove to be highly cost effective but fall in the non-NATO band, a good part of which overlaps Indian Defence spectrum thereby leading to major contention for the Indian commercial telecommunication operators with the already occupied defence spectrum. This situation gets further compounded by the fact that Indian Defence also buys a sizable part of their telecommunication equipment, radars and avionics from both NATO and non-NATO countries. These factors result in spectral constraints. For this reason the defence band needs to be given primacy while formulating NFAP-2000. (Para 2.4)

7.20. Defence is a major user in the NFAP-81, a concept that has stood the test of time and should continue. In addition to the spectral constraints mentioned above, due to the unprecedented growth of public telecommunication services and increase in the number of radio users all along the international border, the problems of Spectrum Management have increased manifold. The speed at which new technologies are introduced further complicate the already complex problems of spectrum management. In the light of the above, the concept of DIZ along our international borders and areas of strategic interest in the hinterland, oceanic region and island territories become relevant in our context, so that during hot war and low intensity conflict scenario our armed forces are able to maintain flexibility and agility in the use of frequency band and have freedom of operation of communication and non communication equipment over the entire areas in the DIZ. The proposal of DIZ as conceptualised should be accepted and implemented in NFAP – 2000. (Para 6.2)

7.21. In order to address the issues related to National Security, and protect the defence interests in the use of frequency spectrum, there is an explicit need that representatives of defence services of appropriate rank are co-opted in the decision making process on formulation of telecom policies and development of telecom infrastructure in the country. This would enable defence to ab-initio examine the security and frequency spectrum aspects. It would also ensure that operational requirements of the defence are integrated in the overall plans for development of telecom infrastructure in the country. (Para 6.5)